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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A Treaty in Conflict with Title VII:
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines from
an International Human Rights
Perspective
I. INTRODUCTION
Direct foreign investment in the United States, including joint
ventures as well as the outright purchase of American companies, in-
creased dramatically in the past decade.I With the accompanying im-
portation of foreign management and culture, questions naturally
arise over how American workers will fare under their new foreign
managers. A fundamental issue confronting United States policymak-
ers is the degree to which foreign companies should be held to United
States nondiscrimination standards.
In recent employment lawsuits, some foreign corporations have
argued that commercial treaties, signed between 1946 and 1956,2 ex-
empt them from certain nondiscrimination standards in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 3 These bilateral "Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation" ("FCN") treaties state that foreign
employers may hire executives and other essential personnel "of their
1. From 1982 to 1987, direct foreign investment in the United States more than
doubled, jumping from just under $125 billion to nearly $262 billion. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Position in the U.S., U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESSES (Aug. 1988), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES No. 1358 at 777 (109th ed. 1989).
2. During this period, the United States entered into these "friendship, commerce and
navigation" treaties with 16 countries. For a good historical overview of the treaties from the
perspective of their chief architect, see generally Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958) [hereinafter Walker, Modern Treaties];
Walker, The Post- War Commercial Treaty Program of the United States, 73 POL. SCI. Q. 57
(1957) [hereinafter Walker, Post- War Treaty]; Walker, Provisions on Companies in United
States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, Provisions on
Companies]; Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, United
States Practice].
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-57
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982)).
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choice."'4 In United States employment discrimination cases, foreign
defendants have asserted that the FCN treaty provision conflicts with,
and takes precedence over, certain Title VII protections. 5 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with this position in
1981, while the Sixth, Second, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals
subsequently rejected it, leaving the courts in conflict over the reach
of the FCN treaty hiring provision.
6
This Note critiques the Third Circuit's recent analysis of the is-
sue in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines. 7 In December 1988, the
court held that an American executive replaced by a South Korean
national could maintain a Title VII discrimination claim against a
Korean corporation.8 The court concluded that the FCN treaty be-
tween Korea and the United States did not conflict with Title VII and
the treaty provided only limited hiring protections for foreign
corporations. 9
In analyzing the MacNamara decision, this Note urges United
States courts to incorporate international human rights law into their
analysis of bilateral treaties. It suggests the United States should not
relinquish its position as a leader in promoting fair employment prac-
tices. This author first reviews the history of the FCN treaties and
prior cases addressing the FCN treaty-Title VII conflict. This Note
then criticizes the MacNamara decision and traditional methods of
treaty interpretation as unreliable, because both excessively defer to
the State Department and ignore the views of United States treaty
partners. 10
4. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United
States-Korea, art. VIII(l), 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223 T.I.A.S. No. 3947 (hereinafter Korean FCN
Treaty]. The treaty reads in pertinent part:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the
territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive per-
sonnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice. Moreover, such nation-
als and companies shall be permitted to engage accountants and other technical
experts regardless of the extent to which they may have qualified for the practice of a
profession within the territories of such other Party, for the particular purpose of
making examinations, audits and technical investigations for, and rendering reports
to, such nationals and companies in connection with the planning and operation of
their enterprises, and enterprises in which they have a financial interest, within such
territories.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 32, 36, 45, 61-62.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 31, 37, 46, 72.
7. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
8. Id. at 1147.
9. Id. at 1145-47.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 108-34.
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This Note advocates an alternative approach: A greater use of
international human rights law and nondiscrimination standards in
treaty interpretation. Incorporating international fair employment
standards would help deflect charges by trading partners that United
States courts are simply imposing American legal and cultural norms
on foreign employers. "1 This approach could enhance enforcement of
human rights worldwide and help remove any competitive advantages
gained by countries that rigidly control their workers. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of FCN Treaties and Their Employment
Provisions
Following World War II, the United States negotiated a number
of FCN treaties, with the primary purpose of promoting American
commercial interests abroad and encouraging the free international
movement of investment capital.13 Herman Walker, acknowledged as
the chief architect of the FCN treaties, stated they provided a "ready-
made framework" 14 that was easily negotiable with individual coun-
tries. The FCN treaties "all follow the same pattern"' 15 and in many
cases are worded identically.
Walker stated that a key purpose of the provision regarding em-
ployment privileges, such as article VIII(l) in the Korean FCN
Treaty, 16 was to protect against "ultranationalistic policies" by the
host country. 17 Specifically, the employment provision targeted so-
called "percentile" laws.18 A 1954 State Department telegram re-
garding the Netherlands FCN Treaty stated:
The big problem to which the [provision] ... was addressed was
so-called percentile legislation, i.e., laws which stipulated that a
fixed percentage of employees, by number of payroll, must be citi-
zens. It was also occasioned by tendencies in some countries to
forbid the hiring of such essential and specially trained personnel
as accountants unless they were citizens, in situations in which sat-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 215-24.
13. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 229-31.
14. Id. at 230.
15. Blumenwitz, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INT'L LAW 484, 485 (1984).
16. See Korean FCN Treaty, supra note 4.
17. Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra note 2, at 386.
18. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 234; see infra text accompanying note
1990]
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isfactory native accountants simply were not available. 19
However, several historical sources and the plain language of the
FCN treaty employment provision indicate a broader purpose.
Walker stated that article VIII(1) generally allows "free choice" in
the selection of key personnel. 20 In addressing percentile laws in par-
ticular, Walker stated that "management is assured freedom of choice
in the engaging of essential executive employees in general, regardless
of their nationality, without legal interference from percentile restric-
tions and the like. ...'121
A realistic reading of the employment provision requires consid-
eration of the world economy during the early 1950s. Following
World War II, the United States began to assert its economic and
political clout worldwide. 22 Commercial treaties helped assure
United States corporations they could control their expanding foreign
operations. In defending the FCN treaties before Congress, State De-
partment officials emphasized the extensive protections the treaties of-
fered.23 The broad language of article VIII(l) helped ensure
corporate discretion in selecting key personnel and managing Ameri-
can investments in lesser developed countries such as Korea. Walker
acknowledged the potentially "lopsided" nature of investment agree-
ments in which only one of the parties had capital to export, but he
concluded that by providing noninvestment benefits such as visa
rights for merchants, balance and fairness was achieved in the FCN
treaties.24
Walker set forth three standards of treatment between FCN
treaty partners. The general treaty goal was "national treatment,"
meaning foreign companies would be treated equally with companies
of the host nation.25 A second standard, contingent on the rules of
the host nation, was the "most-favored-nation treatment," which as-
19. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant at 7,
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1741)(citing Foreign
Service Dispatch [sic] No. 144 from The Hague U.S. Embassy to Dep't of State, Aug. 16, 1954,
at 4) (Supp. app. at 32)) [hereinafter State Dep't Amicus Brief].
20. Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra note 2, at 386 n.62.
21. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 234 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 231.
23. One State Department official described the treaty as providing "the right of the
owner to manage his own affairs and employ personnel of his choice .. " Hearings before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2-3 (1953) [hereinafter
Hearings].
24. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 244.
25. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 2, at 811.
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sured treatment no less favorable than that received by other foreign
companies. 26 The third measure, a rarely-used noncontingent stan-
dard, provided absolute protections, regardless of how domestic or
other foreign firms were treated.
27
The objective of the treaties was a "policy of equity and hospital-
ity to the foreign investor. ' ' 28 However, Walker stated that article
VIII(l) "technically goes beyond national treatment to prevent the
imposition of ultranationalistic policies. ' ' 29 This explanation, coupled
with the provision's unqualified "of their choice" language, indicates
the FCN treaty employment provision was a noncontingent or abso-
lute rule. Had the drafters intended, they could have easily subjected
corporations to the employment laws of the host nation.
B. Pre-MacNamara Caselaw on the Scope of the FCN Treaty
Employment Provision
Prior to the MacNamara decision in 1988, the Second, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals addressed the FCN treaty-Title VII
conflict but reached different results. Also prior to the MacNamara
decision, the Supreme Court dodged an opportunity to end the dis-
pute over the reach of the FCN treaty employment provision when it
heard Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano.
3°
1. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Spiess v. C. Itoh &
Co. 31 attempted to reconcile United States anti-discrimination laws
with provisions of the Japanese FCN Treaty. 32 American employees
of C. Itoh33 filed a class action suit alleging discrimination; however,
the Japanese owner claimed the FCN employment provision provided
total discretion in hiring key personnel. 34
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the provision permitted Japa-
nese companies to discriminate in favor of their own citizens when
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 230.
29. Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra note 2, at 386.
30. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
31. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. Id.
33. C. Itoh & Company (America) was incorporated in New York, but was completely
owned by a Japanese corporation. Id. at 355.
34. Id.
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hiring key personnel without regard to American employment laws. 35
The court pointed out that the overriding goals of the FCN treaty
were to provide a stable environment for American investment abroad
and to avoid interference from domestic employment laws.3 6 The
court cited a general rule that subsequent federal legislation will inval-
idate a treaty obligation only if congressional intent to do so is clearly
expressed. 37 Since Congress never addressed the FCN treaty in Title
VII, the court refused to invalidate the treaty's employment
provision.38
2. Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Avag-
liano v. Sumitomo Shoji Inc. 39 held that the same FCN treaty with
Japan did not exempt Sumitomo Shoji from Title VII, but did allow it
to hire based on considerations of national origin 40 The court con-
cluded that Title VII's narrow "bona fide occupational qualification"
("BFOQ") exception applied.41 Under this exception, the employ-
ment of a Japanese citizen must be "reasonably necessary to the suc-
cessful operation of its business [in the United States]. ' 42 For
example, the employment decision could be justified by factors such
as the employee's knowledge of Japanese products, markets, language,
and culture.
43
The Supreme Court vacated the decision on different grounds."
It held that the wholly-owned subsidiary was not a Japanese corpora-
tion and therefore was not protected under the FCN treaty.45 The
Court stated that the general purpose of the FCN treaties "was not to
give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but
instead to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal basis
35. Id. at 362.
36. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359-60.
37. Id. at 362 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963)).
38. Id.
39. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
40. Id. at 559.
41. Id. The BFOQ exception is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e)(1) (1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. Other factors include the employee's "familiarity with the personnel and work-
ings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and [the employee's] acceptability to those
persons with whom the company.., does business." Id.
44. Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
45. Id. at 187-88.
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without suffering discrimination based on their alienage."' 46 The
Court, however, expressed no view on whether employment of a for-
eign national would be protected under a BFOQ exception.47
3. Wickes v. Olympic Airways
In 1984, following the Sumitomo decision, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Wickes v. Olympic Airways 48 rejected the treaty
interpretation given by the Spiess court.49 The Wickes court instead
held that the foreign defendant had no privilege to discriminate
against or among non-Greek citizens on the basis of race, sex, or na-
tional origin.50 The plaintiff in Wickes claimed the Greek-owned air-
line violated Michigan's anti-discrimination laws by firing him on the
basis of age and national origin. 51 Olympic Airways claimed immu-
nity under an FCN treaty.
52
Stating that the court's role was to give effect to the intent of the
treaty parties, 53 the Sixth Circuit concluded the treaty's drafters only
envisioned a narrow privilege to employ Greek citizens for certain
high level positions and not wholesale immunity from compliance
with American labor laws. 54 This holding repeated the State Depart-
ment's narrow reading that percentile laws were the target of the
treaty's employment provisions. 55 Although the Sixth Circuit ac-
knowledged the absolutist and unqualified language of the FCN treaty
provision, it concluded the treaty and Michigan's anti-discrimination
laws did not conflict. 56 Therefore, foreign employers could discrimi-
nate based on citizenship, but not for reasons of national origin, age,
race, or sex. 5
7
In summary, the pre-MacNamara decisions of Spiess, Sumitomo,
and Wickes reveal the conflict among the circuit courts regarding the
reach of the employment provisions of FCN treaties. The Wickes
court interpreted the provision as providing less hiring discretion than
46. Id.
47. Id. at 189 n.19.
48. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
50. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 369.
51. Id. at 364.
52. Id. at 365.
53. Id. (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)).
54. Id.
55. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 367.
56. Id. at 368. In such a conflict, the treaty would prevail.
57. Id. at 368-69.
1990]
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that contemplated in Spiess.58 The Supreme Court, although com-
menting on some sub-issues, declined in Sumitomo to rule on the
broader subject of the apparent FCN treaty-Title VII conflict.5 9 Af-
ter considering these prior decisions, the MacNamara court followed
the approach of the Wickes court.
III. MACNAMARA v KOREAN AIR LINES
A. Facts
Plaintiff Thomas MacNamara, a 57-year-old white American
male, was employed by Korean Air Lines ("KAL") as a district sales
manager, based in Philadelphia. 6° He began working with KAL in
1974, and in 1977 was promoted from salesperson to district sales
manager for Delaware, Pennsylvania, and southern New Jersey.6'
KAL fired MacNamara on June 15, 1982 and replaced him with a 42-
year-old Korean citizen who had been in charge of KAL's Washing-
ton, D.C. office.
62
In November 1982, MacNamara filed suit under Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").
63
He alleged KAL discriminated against him on the basis of his race,
national origin, and age.64 In response, KAL claimed immunity
under article VIII(l) of the Korean FCN Treaty. 65 KAL pointed to
treaty language stating that companies of Korea and the United States
could "engage" executives and other key personnel "of their
choice."' 66 KAL thus asserted it had complete freedom to hire and
remove such personnel, regardless of United States anti-discrimina-
tion laws.67
MacNamara, joined by the United States in amicus,68 sought a
much narrower reading of the treaty provision. Article VIII(l),
MacNamara argued, only granted foreign businesses the right to se-
58. Id. at 363.
59. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88.
60. MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135, 1137 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349
(1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1138.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1138.
66. MacNamara v. KAL, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 389 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
rev'd, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
67. Id. at 389-90.
68. State Dep't Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 7.
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lect key personnel on the basis of citizenship---but not age, race, or
national origin.69 In addition, MacNamara claimed the term "en-
gage" allowed the hiring, but not firing of such personnel. 70 He also
denied he was an executive with administrative duties and argued that
his sales manager job was not the type of "essential" position over
which treaty partners had been given greater discretion. 71
The district court granted KAL's motion to dismiss, concluding
that Title VII's nondiscrimination standards conflicted with the Ko-
rean FCN Treaty's broad hiring discretion and that the treaty lan-
guage controlled. 72 Giving great weight to the treaty's plain language,
the court held that the treaty gave KAL "free discretion" to hire and
fire executives such as MacNamara. 73 The court noted that a similar
FCN treaty with Pakistan limited the scope of the "of their choice"
provision by adding the qualifier "in accordance with the applicable
laws."' 74 The qualifier in the Pakistani treaty suggests that foreign em-
ployers must meet domestic standards. The district court stated that
the absence of this additional qualifying language in the Korean
treaty indicated an "unfettered" right to select key personnel. 75
B. Reasoning of the Appellate Court
1. General Treaty Interpretation Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 76 conclud-
ing that the treaty did not override Title VII. 77 The court viewed its
role as "limited to ascertaining and enforcing the intent of the Treaty
parties." a78 The treaty's literal meaning would control unless its appli-
cation produced a "result inconsistent with the intent or expectations
of signatories. ' 79 The court sought to reconcile the treaty and United
States domestic law to avoid finding a conflict.80 The court stated that
69. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1138. The court stated that national origin refers to the
place of birth or home of one's ancestors, which it distinguished from citizenship. Id. at 1147
(citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973)).
70. MacNamara v. KAL, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 385.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 389.
73. Id. The court stated that "neither Title VII nor the ADEA abrogated those Treaty
obligations and the Treaty has to be recognized as a narrow exception to them." Id. at 390.
74. Id. at 387.
75. MacNamara v. KAL, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 387.
76. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1143 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)).
79. Id. (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).
80. Id. at 1144.
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federal statutes and the FCN treaty should be interpreted to "effectu-
ate the purpose of both while not sacrificing the terms of either. ' 81 If
the two could not be reconciled, "the treaty must prevail" over subse-
quent legislation unless Congress clearly expressed an intent that the
legislation affect existing treaty rights. 82 In addition, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that courts have traditionally given "great weight" to the
State Department's reading of treaties since the department is gener-
ally responsible for treaty negotiation and enforcement.8 3
2. Treaty History and Analysis
In applying this interpretive approach to the facts of the case, the
Third Circuit accorded great weight to the State Department's view
that the driving impetus behind the treaty's employment provision
was the avoidance of "percentile" laws.8 4 These laws, requiring
American companies abroad to hire a certain percentage of host-na-
tion citizens, were described as the "target" of article VIII(l), despite
plain language suggesting otherwise.85 The court cited the State De-
partment's view that article VIII(l) created only a "limited privilege"
and not a "broad exemption from laws that prohibit discrimination
on grounds unrelated to citizenship."
'8 6
The court acknowledged that the broad "of their choice" lan-
guage of the employment provision assured more than "national
treatment," meaning treatment equal to that of domestic corpora-
tions.8 7 However, the court rejected KAL's view that the airline
should be free from judicial scrutiny of its motives in selecting Kore-
ans for executive positions.88 The Third Circuit concluded foreign
companies should not receive such broad hiring discretion, since such
discretion would provide an unfair competitive advantage over Amer-
ican corporations, which often had to justify their hiring decisions in
court. 89
The Third Circuit also rejected the district court's rationale that
the plain meaning of the treaty should prevail and the absence of
81. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)).
82. Id. at 1146 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
83. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
21-22 (1963)).
84. Id. at 1144.
85. Id.
86. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1141.
87. Id. at 1143.
88. Id. at 1144.
89. Id. at 1146 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982)).
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available qualifying language showed an intent for broad protec-
tions. 90 The district court had relied on a similar Pakistani FCN
Treaty which stated that foreign corporations could hire key person-
nel of their choice, but included the qualifier "in accordance with the
applicable laws." 91 The district court argued that the absence of this
limiting language in the Korean treaty indicated Korean corporations
had an "unconditional" freedom of choice regarding essential person-
nel. 92 The Third Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the
narrow goal of curbing the abusive percentile laws guided the original
treaty negotiators. 93 Thus, KAL did not have the right to fire
MacNamara based on age or national origin.
In addition to rejecting the district court's interpretive approach,
the Third Circuit also found "no logical conflict" between the FCN
treaty and either Title VII or the ADEA.94 It construed the treaty as
allowing the selection of essential personnel based on citizenship.
95
However, Title VII and the ADEA prevented discrimination based on
age, race, and national origin.96 The court concluded that "national
origin discrimination and citizenship discrimination are distinct phe-
nomena. ' '97 It cited Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. 98 for the proposition
that Title VII did not bar discrimination based specifically on
citizenship. 99
Distinguishing between citizenship discrimination and national
origin discrimination would not be a problem for triers of fact, the
court concluded. 10° It found inherent in the history of Title VII a
congressional determination that a trier of fact could distinguish be-
tween the two forms of discrimination.'10 Plaintiffs would have the
90. Id. at 1145.
91. MacNamara v. KAL, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 387 (citing Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, United States-Pakistan, art. VIII, 12 U.S.T. 110-
14, T.I.A.S. 4683).
92. Id.
93. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1145.
94. Id. at 1146.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court chose not to address the BFOQ exception which is a possible method
of avoiding a conflict between Title VII and article VIII(l). See supra text accompanying
notes 36-41.
98. 414 U.S. 86, 88, 94 (1973).
99. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147. The Espinoza Court held that nothing in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage. 414
U.S. at 95.
100. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
101. Id.
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burden of showing that "but for" race, age, or national origin, they
would not have been terminated. 0
2
Another potential problem addressed by the court was the possi-
bility that the threat of discrimination suits would deter foreign inves-
tors.10 3 However, the court concluded that unrestricted hiring
discretion would give foreign corporations an unfair competitive ad-
vantage, since "defending personnel decisions is a fact of business life
in contemporary America."' 1 4
Despite holding that MacNamara could bring a discrimination
claim, the court rejected MacNamara's argument that KAL's liability
could be based on a mere showing that its hiring practices had a dis-
criminatory effect. 05 To prevail, a plaintiff must prove the foreign
employer intended to discriminate. 106 Otherwise, the court reasoned,
corporations from countries with homogeneous populations, such as
Korea, could be subjected to excessive claims based on an unavoida-
ble appearance of discrimination.10 7 Disparate impact evidence could
be used, the court suggested, but not without regard to the employer's
subjective intent.10 8 This restriction and the plaintiff's rigorous bur-
den of proof offset the court's general holding that MacNamara could
maintain a discrimination suit against KAL.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Treaty Interpretation
The Third Circuit in MacNamara downplayed the importance of
the plain meaning of the FCN treaty's actual text. By focusing in-
stead on the intent of the signatories, the court attempted to avoid
confronting the clear language of the treaty. 1°9 But recent caselaw
addressing treaty interpretation reiterates the central importance of
treaty language." 0
Echoing the caselaw, the Restatement (Revised) of the Law of
Foreign Relations states that treaties are to be interpreted in accord-
102. Id. at 1147 n.15.
103. Id. at 1147.
104. Id.




109. Id. at 1143.
110. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 398 (1985).
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ance with the "ordinary meaning" of their terms."' Although treaty
interpretation has traditionally incorporated sources beyond plain
language, 112 the MacNamara court's approach was extreme, virtually
dismissing the plain meaning entirely. With the Korean FCN Treaty,
the plain language is particularly significant, because, as KAL noted,
the United States negotiators were capable of qualifying the broad
protections of article VIII(l) had they chosen to do so.'1 3
In general, however, determining the precise meaning of treaty
provisions is inherently problematic. 'i4 First, treaty language is often
generalized and subject to more than one interpretation." 5 General
treaty language may actually have a very specific meaning, negotiated
and informally agreed upon by the parties." 6 Despite the interpretive
rules set forth by the Restatement and Vienna Convention" I7 regard-
ing the weight to be accorded treaty language, courts do not follow
111. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 325 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1985). Section 325 reads:
(1) An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in light of its
objects and purpose.
(2) Any subsequent agreement between parties regarding the interpretation of the
agreement, or subsequent practice between the parties in the application of the
agreement is to be taken into account in interpreting the agreement.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Restatement section 325 sets forth the following guidelines: 1)
courts should interpret treaties liberally and in good faith; 2) courts should interpret treaties
according to the ordinary meaning of their terms; and 3) courts should give substantial weight
to the signatories' practical construction of the treaty. Id.
112. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
"[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their mean-
ing we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and
the practical construction adopted by the parties." Id.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
114. See Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 287-97 (1988).
115. Id. at 287-88.
116. Id. at 308; see also Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1023 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Jurisprudence]. The author states that
treaty drafters often view a vague treaty as a first step toward a more workable future docu-
ment because "a vague treaty is better than no treaty." Id. at 1065.
117. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Rule 32, arts. 31, 32,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states:
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objec-
tive and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
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these rules with any consistency.' 18
Another source for treaty interpretation, transcripts of Senate
ratification hearings, received little attention from the MacNamara
court because of its deference to the State Department's amicus brief,
which focused on the treaty's negotiating history." 9 As KAL demon-
strated in its appellate brief, treaty discussions in the Senate are sub-
ject to multiple interpretations.12 0 Since the Senate largely plays an
advisory role in treaty ratification, its actual intent may be unknown
particularly where Senators disagree over various provisions.
121
During a typical hearing, the State Department urges passage
and provides assurances, while the Senators ask only general ques-
tions. 2 2 One commentator observed: "A legislator, having no partic-
ular interest in the legislation, whether treaty or domestic statute,
might not speak with a committee member, attentively listen to de-
bate, read the committee report, and heaven forbid, might not even
read the bill or treaty before casting her vote."'' 2 3
Rather than looking to the Senate hearings or treaty text, the
MacNamara court focused on the negotiating history and writings of
the treaty drafters to discern the parties' intent. 124 The court relied on
the State Department's amicus brief, the writings of treaty drafter
Herman Walker, and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Wickes. 2 5
It embraced the view of the State Department and the Wickes court
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Id. at 691-92. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it considers
it to be evidence of customary international law.
118. See Vandevelde, supra note 114, at 297.
119. 863 F.2d 1135; see supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
120. Brief for Appellee at 12, 13, 26, 27, 29, 36, 42, 43, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,
863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1741).
121. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1034.
122. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 23.
123. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1035 (citing Immigration and Naturali-
zation Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 997 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)).
124. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1141-46.
125. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 14-19, 48-59.
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that the FCN treaties were drafted only to provide narrow protections
from percentile legislation.
For the MacNamara court, and for judges and attorneys in gen-
eral, histories of treaty negotiations present great difficulties. Where
meanings agreed upon by negotiators are not explicit in the text, law-
yers may be forced to sift through numerous State Department mem-
oranda and perhaps even contact the individual negotiators.
26
Information from negotiating sessions is often classified or unpub-
lished and many foreign materials are also unavailable. 27 In addi-
tion, these historical sources may conflict. 2  Inevitably, as in
MacNamara, the judicial system is forced to rely on the executive
branch's interpretation of these materials and the court's analysis is
skewed, reflecting policy shifts and political biases in the executive
branch.
B. Deference to the State Department and National Bias
The Third Circuit's deference to the State Department's histori-
cal analysis is typical of American courts. 29 The agencies that nego-
tiate treaties are the most knowledgeable about the drafters'
intentions, as well as modem developments in international law,
which often shape treaty interpretation. 30 In addition, the courts
generally have deferred to the executive in matters of foreign policy.
Delegating treaty interpretation to the State Department may
streamline the court's analysis, but it can lead to inconsistent results,
which vary with diplomatic personnel and political changes.' 3 ' The
judiciary, by providing a more neutral forum, can enhance interna-
tional acceptance of treaty-related decisions.1
3 2
One commentator has suggested that judicial criteria used to
126. Vandevelde, supra note 114, at 307-10; see also Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note
116, at 1041. "A legal system that places nearly dispositive weight on rules not generally
known loses much of its ethical validity. Treaty interpretation that gives such weight to
largely inaccessible evidence falls into the same category." Id.
127. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1038 n.73.
128. See, e.g., Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184 n.10. Two contradictory letters, both written
after ratification by State Department lawyers, were admitted into evidence. The Court con-
cluded "neither of these letters is indicative of the state of mind of the Treaty negotiators; they
are merely evidence of the later interpretation of the State Department as the agency . . .
charged with interpreting and enforcing the Treaty." Id.
129. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1050; see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
130. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1050-51.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1051-52.
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evaluate an agency's statutory interpretation may also apply to inter-
preting treaties.1 33 These criteria include the period of time that has
elapsed since a statute's adoption and whether the agency's interpreta-
tion has remained consistent.1 34  Applying these criteria to
MacNamara indicates the weight accorded the State Department's
views was excessive. As KAL noted, the agency's FCN treaty inter-
pretation changed from its reading in the Wickes case just four years
earlier.1 35 Further, some thirty years had elapsed since ratification,
suggesting the State Department's views were less reliable and should
have been more closely scrutinized by the court.
The MacNamara court focused on the views of United States
diplomats and legislators and largely ignored the Korean govern-
ment's interpretation of the treaty. 36 As a result, the court's conclu-
sions about the drafters' intent carry a pro-American bias. The
Supreme Court in Sumitomo emphasized the importance of incorpo-
rating the views of both treaty parties. 137 However, as MacNamara
illustrates, in practice, American courts rarely address the interpreta-
tions of treaty partners, thereby producing a national bias.' 38
C. Treaty History
In adopting the State Department's version of the FCN treaties'
negotiation history, 39 the Third Circuit minimized the acknowledged
133. Id. at 1049.
134. Id.
135. Brief for Appellee at 32-33, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No.
87-1714) (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26 n. 16, Sumitomo Shoji Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982)). In Wickes, the United States government's amicus brief
stated that companies could "select top-level management without having to justify the deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis." Id.
136. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146 n. 13. The court of appeals stated that, unlike the
district court, it saw no conflict between the respective views of the State Department and the
Korean government. Id. The district court noted that the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
believed that the treaty prevailed over conflicting domestic laws. MacNamara v. KAL, 45
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 389.
137. Sumitomo Shoji Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 183-85 (1982).
138. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1037-41. The author, however, qualifies
his discussion of national bias. He asserts that "national bias is not inconsistent with the treaty
interpretation role of domestic courts. American courts interpret treaties only to enforce do-
mestic obligations.... Thus, the scope of the Court's treaty powers and duties does not extend
beyond the nation's borders." Id. at 1038.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30; see also Lansing & Palmer, Sumitomo
Shoji v. Avagliano: Sayonara to Japanese Employment Practices in Conflict with Title VII, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 153, 156-57 (1984). The authors offer a more realistic assessment of the
history of the FCN treaties, noting that only the United States could afford foreign investment.
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purpose of the treaties-protection of United States business interests
abroad. As the district court pointed out, limiting language was used
in at least one other FCN treaty.1 40 Had the treaty solely targeted
percentile laws, the treaty drafters could have tailored the document
specifically to prohibiting those laws. However, allowing American
companies to hire personnel "of their choice" indicates the United
States sought broader protections from potential domestic interfer-
ence. To dismiss this broad reach and clear language simply because
percentile laws were one target of the provision is extreme.
Both the MacNamara court and the State Department ignored
the dramatic historical disparity in economic power between Korea
and the United States. When the treaty was ratified in 1956, South
Korea was rebuilding from war.' 4 ' Stated one historian, "[d]uring the
1950s South Korea was heavily dependent upon aid, not only for its
growth prospects, but also for its day-to-day function."' 42 This "one-
sided, rather than mutual, relationship of assistance and influence"'
' 43
challenges the notion that the FCN treaty was freely negotiated be-
tween equals and intended as a reciprocal document. This further
suggests that the employment provision was intended to have a broad
reach to protect the economic interests of the stronger treaty partner.
In the mid-1950s, protections against employment discrimination
were just beginning to emerge in the United States. 44 Title VII did
not exist, 145 and only a few states had enacted employment discrimi-
nation statutes. 46 It is highly unlikely that the FCN treaty drafters
ever contemplated a conflict between the treaty and future United
See also Walker, United States Practice, supra note 2, at 234 (counter to the government's
narrow view of article VIII(l)).
140. See supra text accompanying note 91.
141. See Park, From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Korea's Economic Relationship with
the United States, 1945-1980, in KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CENTURY OF COOPER-
ATION 243-46 (1984).
142. Chung, The Development of the South Korean Economy and the Role of the United
States, in THE UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE 191 (G. Curtis & S. Han ed. 1983).
143. Han, South Korea and the United States: Past, Present and Future, in THE UNITED
STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE 202 (G. Curtis & S. Han ed. 1983). Han concludes:
"Although extremely close and generally cordial, the U.S.-South Korea relationship is charac-
terized by a high degree of asymmetry, in the perceptions, objectives, capabilities, and influ-
ence of the two partners." Id.
144. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-57
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982)).
145. When the Senate was addressing the FCN treaties, nine states had laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment. Schwartz, Commercial Treaties in the American Civil Rights
Laws, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 951 n.23 (1979).
146. Id.
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States nondiscrimination laws, much less a conflict arising from South
Korean investment in this country.
What is really at work in the MacNamara case is the application
of a double standard by the United States, enforced by its judicial
system. As KAL argued before the court of appeals:
Changes in the international marketplace, as well as changes in the
social mores within the United States, may have caused the United
States to regret the broad, but reciprocal, freedom it negotiated for
corporations to exercise free discretion over who they hire to con-
trol foreign branch operations. Yet, if the United States did not
intend for Korean corporations to be able to engage executives "of
their choice," then the United States had a duty to convey that to
the Korean negotiators clearly and unequivocally across the bar-
gaining table. They did not, however, do so.1
47
The only way for the Third Circuit to avoid enforcing the clear,
simple language of the FCN treaty was to limit its scope and find that
it did not conflict with or prevail over domestic employment laws.
The district court warned of the pitfalls of the strained historical anal-
ysis necessary to avoid the obvious treaty-Title VII conflict. It fa-
vored "construing the treaty language plainly and not contorting it to
protect what is likely a relatively small number of persons who know-
ingly assume essential positions .... ,,148
D. An International Human Rights Law Perspective
The analysis offered by the Third Circuit degenerated into a nar-
row historical search for the intent of the treaty drafters.
MacNamara demonstrates the manipulability of such methods of
treaty interpretation. For example, KAL and MacNamara dueled
with obscure State Department dispatches and Senate hearing tran-
scripts as evidence of the drafters' intent, occasionally citing the same
passages but finding opposite meanings.
149
This traditional approach ignores the large body of international
147. Brief for Appellee at 24, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
1741).
148. MacNamara v. KAL, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 391.
149. For example, the appellate briefs of both parties cited extensively from Senate For-
eign Relations Committee hearings on July 13, 1953. Plaintiff cited the assurances of a State
Department official that the FCN treaties would not encroach on the domestic legislative au-
thority of the states as evidence that the treaties were not intended to override domestic em-
ployment laws. KAL cited the same passage, but argued that it applied only to state laws and
not to employment discrimination law, which is subject to concurrent state and federal legisla-
tion. See Brief for Appellee at 26, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
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human rights law that directly addresses fair employment stan-
dards.150 Although the degree to which the United States is bound to
such standards is unsettled, both the human rights agreements signed
by the United States and the body of customary international stan-
dards regarding employment discrimination can be applied in United
States courts.' 15 The application of international human rights law
naturally extends to interpreting treaties in cases such as
MacNamara.
1. International Human Rights Agreements and the Interpretation
of FCN Treaties
Although the United States has been slow to sign international
human rights agreements, 15 2 it is a party to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,15 3 the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Polit-
1741) and Brief for Appellant at 15, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No.
87-1741).
150. The United Nations Charter states that all member nations shall promote fundamen-
tal freedoms without discrimination as to race, sex, language, or religion. U.N. CHARTER art.
1, para. 3; arts. 55-56; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/8 10, at 71 (1948), reprinted in E. OSMANCZYK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INT'L AGREEMENTS 361-62 (1985); International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
16316 (1966); International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 111), adopted June 25,
1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter ILO Convention]. In 1958, the International Labour Or-
ganisation ("ILO"), in Convention 111 and Recommendation 111, adopted standards protect-
ing workers against discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, political opinion,
national extraction, or social origin. The standards set forth by the ILO are similar to Title
VII anti-discrimination standards in the United States. The ILO Convention allows for the
promotion of fair employment in ways "appropriate to national conditions."
151. See infra text accompanying notes 178-201; see, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 290 (1986); see also R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLI-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-35 (1981); Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts
in the International Legal Order, II VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 11 (1970); Note, The Application of
International Human Rights Arguments in United States Courts. Customary International Law
Incorporated into American Domestic Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 207, 216, 237-38 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Customary International Law]; Comment, A Human Rights Approach to the
Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1715, 1738 (1986) [hereinafter
Comment, Undocumented Workers]; Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link- International
Workers Rights and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443, 444 (1989)
[hereinafter Note, Missing Link].
152. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 CIN. L.
REV. 367, 385 (1985) [hereinafter Lillich, Invoking International Law]. The United States has
yet to sign several major human rights documents. For example, it has not signed the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
153. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in E. OSMANCZYK, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INT'L AGREEMENTS 361-62 (1985).
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ical Rights,1 54 the American Convention on Human Rights, 155 and
the United Nations Charter. 5 6 Most of the human rights instruments
the United States has adopted contain provisions which prohibit gen-
eral forms of discrimination or specifically address employment dis-
crimination.1 57 In addition, the International Labour Organisation
("ILO"), in which South Korea has sought membership since 1985,
sets forth nondiscrimination standards.
158
The United States and South Korea should interpret the FCN
treaty according to the anti-discrimination standards set forth in the
human rights agreements to which they are parties. At a minimum,
the courts can cite language from such agreements as persuasive au-
thority to support rulings against discriminatory treaty interpreta-
tions. 159 However, courts have been reluctant to apply human rights
law directly.
For example, in Spiess 160 the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument
that discrimination allowed by an FCN treaty would violate a higher
law imposed by the anti-discrimination language in article 55 of the
United Nations Charter. 16 1 The court concluded that the human
rights clauses of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing
international obligations and that Title VII is legislation independent
of the charter. 1
62
This analysis echoed a line of cases following the 1950 California
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
155. American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36.
156. U.N. CHARTER, signed in 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, reprinted in 3 BEVANS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1776-1949, 1153 (1970).
157. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55-56 (supporting fundamental freedoms without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion).
158. ILO Convention, supra note 150. South Korea has sought membership in the ILO
since 1985. See ROK to Step Up Bid for ILO Membership in '86: Min Cho, Korea Times, Nov.
16, 1986, at 8, col. 3.
159. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 404-05; see also Paust, Appli-
cation of International Human Rights Standards by United States Courts, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 496,
500-01 (1983).
160. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
161. Id. at 362-63.
162. Id. at 363. A treaty is considered "self-executing" if no domestic legislative action is
required before it can be implemented. See Reinsenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Trea-
ties and US. v. Postal: Win at any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
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Supreme Court decision, Sei Fujii v. California.1 63 Although "entitled
to respectful consideration," the court concluded that the United Na-
tions clauses were not intended to supersede existing laws in the
United States.1 64 The court reasoned in Sei Fufii that the human
rights clauses were too vague to create international law that would
be binding in American courts.' 65 However, this early decision and
its progeny 66 have been strongly criticized by a number of commen-
tators.1 67 They conclude that many international human rights agree-
ments, such as the United Nations Charter, should be deemed self-
executing and therefore directly applicable in American courts.
168
Although a comprehensive review of this complex issue is be-
yond the scope of this Note, two general arguments for extending self-
execution deserve mention. First, critics note that language in mod-
em international human rights documents is often quite specific and
no more indefinite than other treaties and constitutions applied by
United States courts.1 69 Second, the Supreme Court has held that
courts should liberally interpret treaties in favor of protecting the
rights claimed under them. 170 This suggests that United States courts
may enforce portions of human rights documents, particularly those
with growing worldwide acceptance-such as nondiscrimination pro-
visions.171 Otherwise, the "non-self-executing" label "leaves the par-
163. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); see generally Hitai v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Serv., 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965); Davis v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
481 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (D.D.C. 1979); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Diggs v. Dent, Civ. No. 74-1292 (D.D.C. May 14, 1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 797, 804 (1975), aff'd sub nom., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
164. Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 724-25, 242 P.2d at 621-22.
165. Id. at 724, 242 P.2d at 621.
166. See, e.g., Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) and Diggs v. Dent,
Civ. No. 74-1292 (D.D.C. May 14, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 797, 804 (1975), aff'd sub
nom., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
167. See, e.g., Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Liti-
gation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 924-36 (1984); Schachter, The Charter and the Con-
stitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643 (1951); Note,
The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 194-96 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Evolving the Species].
168. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 156; Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note
151.
169. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 376 n.44.
170. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
171. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 377-79. For further dis-
cussion of the international acceptance of nondiscrimination standards, see text accompanying
notes 186-88.
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ties to a treaty with useless words ... ,
Despite such support among the commentators for the domestic
application of international human rights agreements, major changes
by United States courts appear unlikely. 173 As an intermediate step,
attorneys and judges can cite international human rights documents
as persuasive authority in cases such as MacNamara. In summarily
dismissing international agreements as not self-executing, courts abdi-
cate a duty to protect human rights. Greater domestic application
can help bring enforcement of international agreements that courts
often dismiss with such adjectives as "transcendent." 174
The link between United States civil rights laws and international
nondiscrimination standards further supports the application of inter-
national law. The conventional wisdom has been that provisions in
documents such as the United Nations Charter have had little effect
on domestic civil rights advances. 175 Domestic courts have main-
tained this division to avoid addressing human rights provisions in
various treaties. The Fifth Circuit, for example, rejected an argument
that Title VII was enacted in part to implement the anti-discrimina-
tion provisions of the United Nations Charter. 176 The court stated
that Title VII is "independent of the Charter" and "was enacted in
the domestic interest of the nation."' 177
However, human rights scholar Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. has ar-
gued that the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter
did influence United States civil rights cases. ,78 Focusing on the post-
World War II era, Lockwood found that the charter had a "signifi-
cant impact" on American jurisprudence. 179 After examining cases
on California laws that discriminated against Japanese-Americans, he
found numerous references to the charter's human rights provi-
sions.' 80 For example, in Oyama v. California, Justice Black said of
the human rights protections of articles 55 and 56: "How can this
nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar
land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are per-
172. Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at 1730.
173. See Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 384-85; Note, Evolving the
Species, supra note 167, at 200-01.
174. See Paust, supra note 159, at 499.
175. Lockwood, supra note 167, at 902.
176. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. Id.
178. Lockwood, supra note 167, at 915, 948-49.
179. Id. at 915.
180. Id. at 917-31.
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mitted to be enforced?"'"" American courts can help enforce the
charter's pledge to oppose discrimination by citing language in the
United Nations Charter as well as the words of other individual
human rights documents.
2. The Role of Customary International Human Rights Law
In addition to the effects of individually signed treaties, the body
of international human rights documents taken as a whole can com-
bine with accepted practices among nations to create customary inter-
national norms to bind individual nations.18 2 A growing body of
scholarly work suggests that customary international law binds all na-
tions-even if a nation is not a party to the individual treaties. 8 3
Thus, international human rights agreements, as an expression of
international norms, can have the effect of law, even on nonparties to
the agreements. 8 4 This customary international law does not depend
on formal documents, but emerges by consensus when nations con-
form to international norms.18 5
Such a consensus has emerged regarding international labor stan-
dards, particularly those rejecting hiring discrimination based on na-
tional origin and gender.' 8 6 "Of all norms in international human
181. Id. at 920 (quoting Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
182. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see generally A. D'AMATO, THE CON-
CEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
183. See, e.g., MacDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human
Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919 (1975); Sohn,
"Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986); Weil, Towards Rel-
ative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
184. One district court applied international human rights treaties, even though the
United States was not a party, because the treaties indicated "the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations." Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 564 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); see also
Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 7
WHITTIER L. REV. 741 (1985).
185. Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, 1730-31. For example, the fact
that more than one hundred countries have accepted the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination indicates broad international acceptance of prohibitions
against discrimination. See UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i/Rev. 1 (1978) [hereinafter UNITED NA-
TIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS].
186. UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 185; see also Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 150; Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at
1733-35. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration states that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
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rights law," one commentator has concluded, "the norm against dis-
crimination is among the strongest." 18 7 When various treaties incor-
porate such norms, and the international community adheres to them
through repeated practice, they may be enforced in United States
courts. 188 Such widely-accepted nondiscrimination standards now de-
serve greater application in domestic cases such as MacNamara.
Recent drafts of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States also support the applica-
tion of customary international law.189 Comments to the Restatement
indicate that the individual norms set forth in human rights declara-
tions and conventions have become customary international law. 19°
One commentator concludes that such customary law supersedes con-
flicting state laws, and in principle, earlier inconsistent international
agreements.191 Applying this rule to MacNamara, the court could
have argued nondiscrimination norms create customary international
law, which supersedes any provision of the Korean FCN Treaty with
which it conflicts. For example, an overly broad reading of the
treaty's "of their choice" language would conflict with and be super-
seded by international nondiscrimination norms.
The application of customary international law has occurred in a
number of cases in the United States. The Supreme Court, in The
Paquete Habana,192 established that customary international law is a
birth or other status .... " Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 1. The charter's purposes include
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion .... " Id. This author does not mean
to suggest that such nondiscrimination norms are universally practiced and enforced, only that
the standards are pervasive in international documents and treaties that have received broad
acceptance.
187. Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at 1735 (citing Hoffman, The
Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View from California, 18
INT'L LAW. 61, 64 (1984)).
188. Note, Customary International Law, supra note 151, at 211.
189. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). Section 102 states in pertinent part:
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the interna-
tional community of states
(a) in the form of customary law....
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to
the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended
for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.
Id.
190. Id. § 701 reporters' notes at 2.
191. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 368.
192. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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part of United States law, and domestic courts have a responsibility to
enforce it. 193 However, courts have shown a reluctance to apply this
part of the Paquete Habana holding.1 94 In 1980, a major advance-
ment in the application of customary law was achieved in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala. 195 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit held that an act of tor-
ture, committed in Paraguay by a Paraguayan police official who later
moved to New York, violated established norms of international
law. 196 Jurisdiction was based on the Alien Tort Statute, 97 which
empowers district courts to hear tort cases committed "in violation of
the law of nations."'' 98 The court cited a number of human rights
documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as
evidence of these international norms. 199
In determining the law of nations, the Filartiga court used a vari-
ety of sources in applying customary international law.200 These in-
cluded United Nations declarations, domestic constitutions and laws,
State Department reports, practices among nations, and scholarly
writings. 20 1 Based on these sources, the court found a universal con-
demnation of torture.20 2 Similarly, international norms protecting'ba-
sic employment rights have gained support from a wide variety of
sources20 3 and might have been applied in MacNamara.
The Tenth Circuit, in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson ,2 4 reit-
erated the proposition that United States courts can discern custom-
ary international law from such sources as the Universal Declaration
and American Convention on Human Rights. 20 5 Fernandez, a Cuban
193. Id. However, the court also stated that customary international law should only be
invoked "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision .... " Id. at 700.
194. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 397.
195. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
196. Id. at 878.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
198. Filartigo, 630 F.2d at 878, 882.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 881-84. For evidence of customary international law regarding torture, the
court looked to treaty law, including the United Nations Charter, United Nations Declara-
tions, State Department reports, domestic law, and scholarly writings. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 881 ("there are few, if any, issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its
custody").
203. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Undocumented
Workers, supra note 151, at 1735.
204. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
205. Id.
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refugee awaiting deportation, argued that his confinement for an in-
definite term violated customary international law against arbitrary
imprisonment. 2°6 Although the court of appeals avoided the direct
application of customary international law, the court used this law as
an interpretive tool to bolster constitutional concepts of due
process.2
07
3. Application of International Human Rights Law in
MacNamara: Strengthening the Rationale
The MacNamara court could have buttressed its holding by in-
corporating international human rights law. Although at least one
author has urged caution in invoking international human rights law
to avoid a "backlash," 208 such law supports interpreting the Korean
FCN Treaty as excluding discrimination based on age and national
origin.
As a first step, United States courts could cite international non-
discrimination provisions as persuasive authority, rather than as an
independent basis for a decision. 2°9 In MacNamara, international au-
thority could have been used to support Title VII requirements to
counter KAL's argument that the Korean FCN Treaty shielded the
airline from discrimination claims. 210 As one human rights author
has observed of cases involving undocumented workers: "Though do-
mestic and international law theories both suffer shortcomings if in-
voked independently, they appear encouragingly acceptable when
combined. ' 21 1 Instead of relying on a purely historical treaty analy-
sis, the MacNamara court might have noted the parallels between Ti-
tle VII and portions of the Universal Declaration of Human
206. Id. at 1388.
207. The court stated that "[d]ue process is not a static concept, it undergoes evolutionary
change to take into account accepted current notions of fairness. Finally, we note that in
upholding the plenary power of Congress over exclusion and deportation of aliens, the
Supreme Court has sought support in international law principles." Id.
208. Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 401, 410.
209. Id. at 410. Lillich states:
If international human rights lawyers today not only argue that the human rights
clauses in the UN Charter are self-executing, but also invoke them indirectly in a
manner that gradually increases the judiciary's consciousness of their existence and,
perhaps more importantly, their potentially enlightening influence, chances are that
the results sought by the intermediary appellate court in Fujii eventually will be
achieved, albeit through [an] indirect route.
Id.
210. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1138.
211. Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at 1744-45.
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Rights. 212 Such human rights agreements can rebut claims that an
FCN treaty allows hiring discrimination based on national origin.
In addition to citing individual agreements signed by the United
States or Korea, the MacNamara court could have "infused" 213 cus-
tomary international law with Title VII. An expansive reading of the
treaty's employment provision in MacNamara is repugnant to world-
wide nondiscrimination norms and arguably violates customary inter-
national law. 214 If a series of multilateral human rights agreements
does not prevail over individual FCN treaties, then nations could sim-
ply avoid international human rights law and discriminate via these
bilateral agreements. 215 Courts can better interpret bilateral agree-
ments by scrutinizing provisions that are inconsistent with customary
international law.
4. Benefits of Incorporating International Human Rights
Standards in Domestic Decisions
In addition to freeing courts from complex and unreliable analy-
ses of treaty histories, incorporating international human rights law
offers a number of benefits. It can counter charges that American
courts have a national bias; it can give meaning to human rights stan-
dards; and it can help diminish the flight of capital to countries that
rigidly control their workers.
Incorporating international human rights law in cases such as
MacNamara would help deflect charges that United States courts sim-
ply impose American cultural and legal standards on foreign parties.
With more foreign capital flowing into the United States, a greater
212. Both documents reject discrimination based on sex, race, and national origin. See
supra notes 3, 186 and accompanying text.
213. One author argues that the term "incorporation" incorrectly suggests that concepts
found in international human rights law are outside the scope of domestic law. Comment,
Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at 1736-41. He prefers "infusion," arguing the term
explains that international law simply illuminates principles already expressed in the United
States Constitution. Id.; see also Lillich, Invoking International Law, supra note 152, at 408-
12.
214. Courts will generally presume that treaty parties did not intend to violate basic prin-
ciples of international law. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 55-57 (1929); Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 268 (1890); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889);
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1887); The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 594-95
(1841).
215. International law followed by customary practice between nations, subsequent to an
inconsistent treaty provision, may prevail as United States law. See RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135, reporters' note 4 at
83 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
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number of employment-related lawsuits involving foreign owners can
be expected. 216 In resolving these disputes, courts that cite interna-
tional standards can enhance foreign acceptance of United States de-
cisions and also minimize retaliatory measures.
For example, in MacNamara, KAL argued that the United
States reneged on a contract between nations because the United
States chose to reject the plain meaning of the FCN treaty. 21 7 KAL
suggested that the United States government was imposing modern
United States social mores rather than adhering to the terms of the
treaty.218 Other trading partners may respond to this American na-
tionalism by imposing their own standards, thereby weakening treaty
agreements. 219 One scholar concludes that "infusion offers a way out
of the judicial provincialism that occurs when courts fail to use
sources of international law in defining 'universal' rights.
'220
Another benefit of applying international human rights law is the
greater protection of human rights worldwide. Though some human
rights documents may not be considered binding or self-executing, the
standards they contain are given meaning when applied in domestic
courts. 221 Using international human rights law to supplement do-
mestic court decisions serves as an intermediate step toward greater
enforcement of that law. By acknowledging international human
rights standards, United States courts can play a vital role in their
acceptance and enforcement.
222
United States support for international standards of nondiscrimi-
nation in employment also helps remove a competitive advantage
gained by some developing nations.223 By maintaining a docile and
inexpensive work force, countries such as South Korea have attracted
216. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
217. Brief for Appellee at 34, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
1741).
218. Id. at 22. KAL also raised the specter of anti-Oriental prejudice by American
factfinders "in this era of 'Japan-bashing.' " Id. at 36.
219. Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enterprise, 73
GEO. L.J. 1465, 1497 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Multinational Enterprise]; see also Lansing &
Palmer, supra note 139, at 168.
220. Comment, Undocumented Workers, supra note 151, at 1738.
221. Id.
222. See R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-35
(1981). Fisher argues that weaving international law into domestic law may practically be the
only way to enforce the international rules, especially when there is no possibility of relief in
their own country.
223. Note, Missing Link, supra note 151, at 452-55.
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multinational corporations and reduced the prices of their exports. 224
Leveling the playing field in the international workplace through
worldwide enforcement of labor rights should limit the flight of capi-
tal from developed nations.
225
The Third Circuit in MacNamara offered a variation of this fair
trade argument that advantages based on discrimination should be
eliminated. It concluded that if the FCN treaty was read to grant
South Korea immunity from Title VII, South Korean corporations
would gain an unfair competitive advantage over domestic employ-
ers.226 The court added that "defending personnel decisions is a fact
of business life in contemporary America and is a burden that the
domestic competitors of foreign enterprise have been required to
shoulder."
227
When nations gain a competitive edge based on discriminatory
practices and suppressed wages, they can worsen working conditions
in other countries as well. 228 To compete, other nations are forced to
reconsider their fair employment standards. The United States
should question whether it is encouraging countries that use oppres-
sive employment practices by providing them free access to United
States markets.
229
In South Korea, massive foreign debt and the vulnerability of an
export-based economy has led to authoritarian controls over labor.230
As one commentator put it, "in assessing the expectations of foreign
creditors and potential investors, whose capital and technology were
needed for South Korean development, [South Korean leaders]
viewed social stability, especially non-confrontational labor relations,
as a sine qua non of rapid industrial progress. ' 231 Korean women,
who earn less than half as much as men and do the most repetitious
224. Id. For an excellent source on South Korean labor practices, see West, South Korea's
Entry into the International Labor Organization: Perspectives on Corporatist Labor Law During
a Late Industrial Revolution, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 477 (1987).
225. See generally POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 553-54 (2d ed. 1977);
WALTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 180-87 (2d ed. 1975); see also Note, Missing Link,
supra note 151, at 452-55.
226. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146.
227. Id. at 1147.
228. See Note, Missing Link, supra note 151, at 453.
229. Id. at 454-55; see also Kerson, Prisoners & Profit: How American Workers Lose Their
Jobs to Union-Busting in Foreign Countries, in SOLIDARITY (1985); Worker Rights and Foreign
Trade, AFL-CIO Am. Federationist, Nov. 8, 1986, at 8.
230. West, supra note 224, at 492.
231. Id.
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work, have suffered particularly under these labor policies. 232 Such
practices can be countered through the greater enforcement of inter-
national fair employment standards.
5. Trade Implications
KAL, in its petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
argued that the specter of defending its choice of executives in local
United States courts would discourage foreign investment.233 In de-
fending the district court's decision against MacNamara, KAL ar-
gued that "by providing a measure of certainty on this issue, the
District Court's approach enhances a corporation's ability to manage
and control its overseas investment. It thus goes a long way to pro-
mote the trade and investment objectives which are at the heart of the
Treaty. ' 234 Other writers argue that a narrow reading of the FCN
treaty employment provision undermines free trade by limiting mana-
gerial and hiring controls over foreign operations. 235 Similarly, some
authors associate the imposition of United States fair employment
standards with trade protectionism. 236 They argue that having to de-
fend hiring decisions is simply one more burden that will limit foreign
investment and increase United States unemployment rates and trade
deficits. 2
37
However, much of the alleged threat to foreign investment in the
United States from domestic nondiscrimination laws is overstated.
First, growing investment in the United States238 indicates the relative
232. Id. at 529-32. West states:
At present, the Government pressures workers in just the opposite direction, ex-
horting them to work longer hours "in the national interest" and praising "volun-
tary" sacrifices in Saemaul indoctrination sessions....
The charge that South Korea has based its economic miracle partly on the ruth-
less exploitation of teenage girls has enough truth to it to shock many outside observ-
ers; the response that other states did the same in the past is simply not a sufficient
excuse today.
Id. at 529, 532.
233. MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 30,
1989 (No. 88-1849).
234. Brief for Appellee at 41, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
1741).
235. See, e.g., Note, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights Under Com-
mercial Treaties to Hire Employees "Of Their Choice," 86 COLUM. L. REV. 139, 162-63 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Subsidiary Assertion].
236. Lansing & Palmer, supra note 139, at 153-54; see also Note, Multinational Enterprise,
supra note 219, at 1497; Note, Subsidiary Assertion, supra note 235, at 162-68.
237. Id. at 167-68. For a discussion of trade barriers, see C.M. SCHMITrHOFF, THE
SOURCE OF LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 228 (1964).
238. Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 1.
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attractiveness and perceived strengths of the United States economy.
Among the factors considered by foreign investors, such as antici-
pated growth and profits, the inability of a foreign employer to dis-
criminate in hiring executives should have little relative influence.
Foreign corporations would still be able to exercise great flexibility in
managing their own affairs, despite protestations to the contrary. 239
The State Department, in recent bilateral investment treaties, sup-
ports holding foreign employers to domestic standards, apparently
with little fear of a flight of foreign capital. 24° Furthermore, domestic
corporations have prospered, despite having to meet Title VII's non-
discrimination standards.
One commentator concludes that such nondiscrimination stan-
dards promote "fair trade" and are mislabeled as "protectionist. '24'
He defines fair trade as "trade which does not rely on artificially de-
pressed labor conditions to gain competitive advantages. ' 242 Simi-
larly, the MacNamara court argued that protection of foreign
companies from Title VII claims provides an unfair competitive ad-
vantage. 243 One commentator concludes that "[c]omplying with U.S.
fair employment laws must be seen as just another cost of doing busi-
ness abroad."' 244 In its efforts to join the ILO, South Korea indicated
it is ready to acknowledge and adopt several of these international fair
employment standards. 2
45
Free trade proponents should keep in mind that "trade is not an
239. Brief for Appellee at 34-36, MacNamara v. KAL, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (No.
87-1741). KAL placed the discussion in terms of control of overseas investment, suggesting
such control would be lost entirely if corporations were required to defend key personnel deci-
sions in court. Id.
240. More recent commercial treaties, the bilateral investment treaties ("BIT"), avoid the
Title VII conflict. For example, the BIT between the United States and Egypt states:
[N]ationals and companies of either Party, and their companies which they own or
control in the territory of the other Party, shall be able to engage the managing
director of their choice. Further, subject to the employment laws of each Party, na-
tionals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the terri-
tory of the other Party, professional and technical personnel of their choice, for the
particular purpose of rendering professional, technical and managerial assistance
necessary for the planning and operation of investments.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept. 29,
1982, United States-Egypt, art. 5(b), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 927, 933 (1982) (treaty unratified)
(emphasis added).
241. Note, Missing Link, supra note 151, at 459-61.
242. Id. at 460.
243. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
244. Street, International Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements as a Bar to Dis-
criminatory Employment Practices, 31 HOWARD L.J. 497, 539 (1988).
245. See generally West, supra note 224.
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end in itself, that its function is to improve the living standards of
workers as well as of consumers and manufacturers." 246 Should the
United States ignore the body of international law that rejects dis-
crimination, as well as its own employment laws, for the cause of un-
fettered free trade? As a world leader, the United States has a
responsibility to promote human rights which overrides the dubious
free-trade benefits of insulating foreign corporations from United
States fair employment laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign companies, operating in the United States in greater
numbers, bring with them conflicting cultural and legal standards re-
garding the treatment of employees. The degree to which these for-
eign employers will be held to United States and international fair
employment standards will be decided in part by American courts.
MacNamara illustrates how the Third Circuit resolved one such con-
flict by favoring United States nondiscrimination laws and interpret-
ing the Korean FCN Treaty as providing only narrow protections for
foreign employers.
247
However, the court's analysis sidestepped both the plain lan-
guage of the treaty and a realistic history of its drafting. 248 The
MacNamara court, in adopting the simplistic historical analysis of the
State Department, strained to conclude that the treaty and Title VII
did not collide, but simply sideswiped each other.249 The unstated
objective of both the court and the United States government appears
to be the imposition of current United States employment policies,
which have undergone numerous advances since the 1957 treaty ratifi-
cation. 250 After stating that its role was to enforce the intent of the
two treaty partners, the court ignored the views of the South Korean
government.
251
The court's analysis illustrates the manipulability of treaty inter-
pretation methods. Vague, general treaty language is often indetermi-
nate without contextual information. 252 Additionally, negotiation
and Senate ratification histories typically contain conflicting state-
246. Note, Missing Link, supra note 151, at 455.
247. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1135.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 73-102.
249. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146-47.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
252. Comment, Jurisprudence, supra note 116, at 1063.
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ments and carry a pro-American bias.25 3 To interpret a treaty based
on an exchange that occurred forty years earlier between self-serving
diplomats and uninformed Senators is unreliable at best.
The use of accepted international human rights standards as in-
terpretive tools can help legitimize this process. In MacNamara, for
example, the court might have incorporated a discussion of interna-
tional nondiscrimination standards in employment. 254 Though these
standards are not universally practiced, the United States and South
Korea are parties to treaties and declarations which contain them.255
Collectively, individual human rights agreements and accepted norms
create customary international law that can bind nations and also
serve as a persuasive element in United States court decisions.
Application of international law in cases such as MacNamara
can help deflect the charge of judicial provincialism by extending the
courts' analysis beyond United States legal and cultural standards.
25 6
In addition, promoting international fair employment standards can
diminish the competitive advantages some nations gain through the
rigid control of their workers.257 Ultimately, the infusion of interna-
tional human rights law with United States nondiscrimination stan-
dards will result in a greater acceptance and enforcement of human
rights.
Greg Warnagieris *
253. Id. at 1036-41.
254. See supra text accompanying note 208.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 215-24.
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